People of my generation, born at the twilight of the Soviet Union, were raised with a simple worldview: evil (the fascists) is punished by good (the USSR and, with reservations, the allies). Everything that did not fit into this concept—shades, nuances, complex categories, irresolvable dilemmas—was set aside. We lived in a society where good answers were absent, and against the backdrop of the state’s monopoly on the truth, the skill of formulating a question was not cultivated.

Unfree memory, unprocessed past

An authoritarian state cannot tolerate critical thinking by its citizens and a critical approach to the past and the politics of memory. The past must be under control at all times. To achieve this, a state mythology is necessary, which supports the only correct narrative of greatness, the legacy of power, and thereby shapes the memory of the past.

One of these supporting myths was an outwardly harmless, but manipulation-rich idea that, having «defeated fascism, we lived for 75 years without war.» Indeed, the shock that World War II left behind in our part of the world became the basis for fundamental changes. Human rights, formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), moved to the center of the social contract, and the Nuremberg Tribunal, which tried the criminals who unleashed an aggressive war, allowed for the formation of international criminal law.

But talking about «peaceful» time, we conveniently set aside the war in Yugoslavia, the wars in Chechnya and Georgia, the genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Sudan, Bosnia—the list of large-scale human rights violations and conflicts could go on. From today’s perspective, we see that peaceful time was a privilege of a narrow circle of countries. The world beyond them remained on fire. Another harmful illusion was that it was possible to simply turn a difficult page of history, leave in the past the state’s crimes against people—repressions, deportations, the Gulag, the Holodomor, the Asharshylyk—and step into a free market and democracy.

Anton Chekhov wrote: «Russians adore their past, hate their present, and fear the future. How sad it would be if we did not think about the fact that the future we fear is gradually turning into the present we hate, and into the past we adore.» And this is not a figure of speech: an unprocessed past emerges in the present and takes on even more terrible forms.

The day after: transitional justice

If one looks at the world outside a Eurocentric, and even more so a Russia-centric perspective, then peaceful time and space shrink to a very limited segment of human history, and transitions come to the fore—different forms of shifting from authoritarian and totalitarian societies, from wars and conflicts to a more democratic structure and post-conflict periods. And if we believe in the progressive development of a civilization striving for democracy and the rule of law, it is very important to understand the processes of transitional justice. They return society to the positions of democracy after crisis-ridden, bloody periods of history. Transitional justice is critically important for exiting the rut of violence, working through the past, building democracy, and moving toward a just society and sustainable peace.

Violence and wars have always existed, but it was only in the 20th century that the project of transitional justice was formulated as an attempt to deal with mass violence and systemic human rights violations after they occurred. Post-war and post-conflict societies created models for working through a difficult past, reforms, and building a more just society. These efforts were based on the conviction that a catastrophe could be followed by a moral reckoning, and that monstrous crimes that received categorical condemnation in the public space should not happen again. «Never again,» «Nunca más» became both a promise and a plea. But the promise didn’t hold.

The very concept of transitional justice is a historically new phenomenon. The term was introduced in the 1980s after justice mechanisms such as truth commissions in Latin America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe were tested. In 1983, in Argentina, the first truth commission was created, CONADEP (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons), which investigated crimes committed by the dictatorship—kidnappings and murders. The idea of individual responsibility, enshrined in international law with the goal of restoring justice after a conflict, is based on the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which condemned war criminals in the second half of the 1940s.

The earliest definition of transitional justice was proposed by Ruti Teitel, a leading world researcher in the field of international law and human rights. In the 1980s, she spoke about transitional justice, which is carried out during a period of turbulent political change and can include legal measures to curb violations committed by preceding repressive regimes. The definition of transitional justice (TJ) promoted by the UN speaks of it as a multidimensional socio-legal process of reconciliation with past atrocities, but does not point to political change as a necessary condition for TJ processes. At the same time, the UN emphasizes the reaction of societies to the legacy of mass and often incomprehensible human rights violations, which pose the most complex questions before politics, law, and social sciences.

Five components of transitional justice

The idea of transitional justice in relation to the mistakes of the past traces its lineage back to ancient Greece. The democratic period that followed the oligarchic «coup of the Four Hundred» (411 BC) in Athens is considered the first example of transitional justice in history. At that time, the restoration of democracy after a period of lawlessness was conducted along a fine line between retribution and reconciliation: individual complaints about rights violations were considered and satisfied, but many political crimes were subject to broad amnesty. A key measure of that process, dokimasia (Greek: δοκιμασία), was the conceptual and functional precursor to lustration. This is a process of checking the ability of citizens to hold public office in order to protect the polis from persons who were involved in crimes and could cause harm.

Gradually, the understanding of transitional justice evolved. Now it is connected not only with the condemnation of specific individuals for their atrocities. It’s how societies respond to the legacies of massive and sometimes unfathomable human rights violations. First and foremost, TJ puts victims at the center of the process—their rights, dignity, and interests—viewing them as key partners and participants in the process of restoring truth and justice.

Each context is unique, but societies that have experienced periods of lawlessness face the same dilemma: when, how, and to what extent to embark on the path toward a peaceful, just, and inclusive future in which the crimes of the past are recognized and corrected, and violence will not happen again. According to the principles of transitional justice, victims and their human dignity must be at the center of this process. This opens the path to a new, more inclusive, and just social contract in which all citizens participate and the rights of everyone are protected.

Traditionally, four main principles (pillars) of transitional justice are distinguished: establishing the truth, restoring justice, providing reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition. A fifth component, memorialization, which was often seen as part of guarantees of non-repetition, is increasingly recognized as a separate and key element: it is necessary to preserve for future generations the memory and information about what happened. Together, these components allow for solving problems related to the legacy of past conflicts and human rights violations, combining legal and humanitarian mechanisms to strengthen peace and responsibility.

All these mechanisms and components are of great importance. Researchers and literature on TJ pay more attention to truth, justice, reparations, and lustration. This distorts the understanding of the complexity of the TJ process and creates a risk of fragmentary application of its mechanisms. After all, memorialization and guarantees of non-repetition are not optional goals, but the main subject and content of the work of transitional justice.

Between revenge and oblivion

Transitional justice is situated on the fine line «between revenge and oblivion,» formula coined by Russian legal scholars, Nikolay Bobrinsky and Stanslav Dmitrievsky «Between Revenge and Oblivion: A Transitional Justice Concept for Russia», a landmark legal report initially published in Russian in October 2020 by the Institute for Law and Public Policy, an updated English-language edition was launched in June 2024 by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC) in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) between reconciliation and punishing those guilty of atrocities.

This dilemma is solved in its own way by every society in an attempt to rebuild life after mass human rights violations. Extrapolating this to the level of the modern understanding of justice, we find ourselves in the dichotomy of «Nuremberg vs. Cold War.» A policy of intransigence toward crimes requires the punishment of crimes against humanity (Nuremberg). But, as the experience of the Cold War shows, one often has to pursue a policy of appeasement (the alliances of the US with right-wing autocrats during the Cold War), make compromises, and close one’s eyes to committed crimes (the West’s reaction to the war between Russia and Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, the downing downing of MH17 as ruled by the UN body, the poisoning of oppositionists, etc).

What do we mean by justice today? And if in the case of today’s Russia justice is becoming less and less, and the end of the Putin regime is somewhere far beyond the horizon, is it possible to talk about transitional justice at all?

It is impossible to establish a universal formula for moral virtue. In Greek, the words «righteousness» and «justice» come from the word dikaiosunē (δικαιοσύνη)—moral order, proper relations with the deity and behavior in accordance with them, righteousness, honesty, decency, equality. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, decency as the highest form of justice can even overcome the imperfections of the law. But is a universal formula for justice possible? And can justice exist outside of context?

We are used to thinking that the worst crimes were committed by Nazi Germany. But now we are observing in real-time the crimes of those whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers once defeated the Nazis. Russian aggression in Ukraine has become a logical continuation of the Soviet Union’s violent suppression of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, the manipulation of Eastern European societies, the wars in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Syria, and the invasion of Georgia in 2008. This does not exhaust the list of crimes and manifestations of imperial dominance that are not considered crimes.

The burden of unrecognized offenses turns into an internal and international time bomb. A similar, although structurally different dynamic is observed in the US, where an unresolved imperial legacy is reflected in polarization, mistrust of institutions, and moral disorientation in foreign policy. Today we see not only the helplessness of the international community in the face of impunity, but also the open violation of international law by democratic states.

History shows that it is not enough to condemn committed crimes just once. Each new generation must not simply «remember,» but also understand how humanity allowed crimes of such scale. It is necessary to be able to see the red flags and dangerous signals that preceded the atrocities, and all the conditions that led to them. But today, legal and moral responsibility understood in this way still remains politically unthinkable for the majority of societies.

A transition of the entire society to a new level of civic consciousness is necessary, where human rights and dignity are understood as an integral part of the world order, and the person and society are accepted in all their complexity. Without this, we remain in that time where large-scale human rights violations can with high probability be repeated.

Civil transitional justice

Traditional paradigms of post-conflict justice can be applied when a crisis situation has already passed: the regime has fallen, the war has ended, the conflict is complete, a transitional government has appeared. But in the case of the USSR and Russia, the conditions for applying transitional justice measures did not arise either after World War II, or after the death of Stalin, or after 1991. The main paradox of the post-war order is that the military victory over fascism became a kind of moral indulgence that the Soviet regime received and the Russian regime inherited from it, thereby securing for itself permanent indulgence and a carte blanche for its own crimes.

Hence the question arises: can responsibility be rethought, can it be understood not in a legal or procedural key, but as a long internal process that unfolds within society? And if so, can this happen in the absence of or in the impossibility of external pushing (as was the case in post-war Germany), can this process become an internal trajectory of the development of states and societies? And in relation to the Russian case: is transitional justice possible in societies in which a quick transition to democracy is not foreseen?

Traditionally, the state is seen as the main actor of transitional justice processes. Civil society acts more as a consultant and auditor of these processes. But with a critical and detailed look at transitional justice in different countries, it becomes obvious that, in fact, the main actor in initiating, preparing transitional justice, and ensuring guarantees of non-repetition is society. Because it is precisely guarantees of non-repetition that are the goal and essence of this process.

A critical rethinking of transitional justice processes opens up to us the need to form not only a holistic and inclusive approach, but also a new political language, without which the transformation of social consciousness will not take place. Civic responsibility must act not only in the legal field, but also as a historical force shaping a more sustainable and inclusive future society.

In the Russian language, there is still critically little literature describing TJ processes. In 2023, in the book «The Role of Civil Society in Transitional Justice: The Case of Russia,» researcher Selbi Durdiyeva analyzed the capabilities of civil society within the framework of transitional justice processes. Civil society can participate in all TJ mechanisms. Selbi writes a lot about the work of «Memorial» and the church at the Butovo shooting range, where victims of Stalinist repressions were shot and buried. Using their example, she shows that civil society can participate in transitional justice beyond state coverage.

Participation in memorialization is the most accessible way of working with a difficult past and present in unfavorable political conditions. This allows for constructively addressing the past, strengthening the voices of victims, fighting impunity, making the names of victims public, and conducting advocacy for justice. At the same time, notes Selbi, there are no universal ways for civil society to participate in TJ. This opens up space for one’s own understanding and formation of a vision for the processes of the future transitional period.

Models for the future

Today, a significant potential for resistance, understanding of violence, and the demand for a transition to democracy has formed in Russian society. This is confirmed by the emergence of various models of transitional justice and visions of a sustainable peace.

For example, the report «100 Days After Putin» presents a model of transitional justice developed by Russian lawyers with the support of «Memorial.» It proposes, first of all, to condemn state terror and restore the rights of victims. All measures of the report are structured into four packages: constitutional scenarios ensuring a democratic transition; democratization (repeal of authoritarian legal norms, reform of the electoral system); transitional justice measures aimed at restoring the rights of victims, lustration of repressive bodies and officials, judicial reform and prosecution of systemic crimes; and measures to resolve the war in Ukraine: recognition of the fact of aggression, reparations, creation of a truth commission, recognition of the mandate of the International Criminal Court, strengthening of domestic legislation on war crimes.

Earlier, in 2023, the Manifesto of Sustainable Peace was published on the Platform of Anti-War Initiatives, prepared by a broad coalition of civil activists, scholars, and experts with a horizontal, inclusive organization of work. This is a roadmap for a transition to a new political culture by means available to civil society already today. That is, not just talk about horizontal democracy, but an attempt to apply it in practice, going beyond the limits of ordinary models of thinking, considering all topics and groups, and not just those that often fall into the zone of public discussion. It was important for us to touch upon problems of the environment, gender equality, and inclusivity; we tried to see the origins of violence and think through ways to exit it based on a decolonial perspective.

A central part of the manifesto was the chapter on transitional justice as the basis of sustainable peace and on the need to eliminate the deep-rooted consequences of impunity, systemic violence, and authoritarian rule. For Russia, this means a clear recognition of the illegality of the occupation of Ukrainian territories, their de-occupation, the restoration of the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, and the elimination of the damage caused by the aggression. We tried to describe transitional justice processes in a comprehensive action plan that goes beyond simple ceasefire agreements and is aimed at deep social and institutional changes necessary for building a democratic, free, and peaceful society.

The Civics for TJ project examines transitional justice in Russia within what it describes as the contemporary «age of impunity.» Drawing on Russia’s experience during the transition from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the project argues that the incomplete implementation of transitional justice contributed to the failure of democratization, the weakening of the rule of law, and the eventual possibility of authoritarian revenge. The initiative’s authors insist that preparations for transitional justice in Russia should begin before the war ends and before political transition takes place. Thus the course and related activities aim to develop knowledge and practical strategies for advancing transitional justice in Russian society, including before a democratic transition occurs. Its primary audience includes teachers, museum professionals, and civil society activists working in Russia and abroad. The project seeks to foster discussions about the past and present in schools and wider society; preserve the work of organizations such as Memorial and anti-war communities; support accountability for crimes committed in Ukraine and within Russia; and contribute to a new social contract grounded in human rights, the protection of vulnerable groups, the overcoming of totalitarian and imperial legacies, and democratic civic education.

Such initiatives, as well as the public discussions surrounding them, are highly valuable for establishing normative benchmarks and cultivating democratic practices that promote inclusivity, transparency, and nonviolence as new social norms. Most importantly, they provide future political forces with an opportunity to develop within the framework of a new, more inclusive democratic culture.

International experience: problems and best practices

It is necessary to take a differentiated and critical look at the international experience of transitional justice. Drawing lessons does not mean that it makes sense for us to copy someone else’s recipes. An understanding and comparison of both best practices and mistakes made, especially in the long term, is required.

For example, in South Africa, civil society institutions that work on preventing torture, raising awareness, and maintaining the memory of victims became an important part of post-apartheid. However, more than 20 years after the completion of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the majority of victims of serious human rights violations during the apartheid era have not received the compensation recommended by the commission. Although international and national law recognize that reparation should be paid, the South African government has not fully implemented these recommendations. Civil society is forced to continue a long struggle for these payments and for a culture of responsibility.

The experience of transitional justice in Serbia shows that after a brutal conflict, political elites can promote narratives that justify violence, revise or challenge the internationally recognized version of events. Being subject to revanchism, they try to justify the decisions of the previous regime, rehabilitate it, and reanimate the policy that led to the conflict.

Thus, the commissions created in Sarajevo and Srebrenica to investigate crimes of the first half of the 1990s caused a mixed reaction: their initiators proclaim the goal of establishing a single truth and adherence to facts and victims. On the contrary, human rights defenders and observers see in the focus on Serbian victims an attempt to «equalize» the responsibility of the parties and relativize Serbian guilt for crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a rethinking of events can lead to the reclassification of the Serbian side from the «main offender» to one of the warring parties. Such rewriting of the results of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is unacceptable.

The example of Argentina shows that despite the attempts of politicians to limit responsibility for past crimes through legislative barriers and pardons for criminals, the sustained pressure of civil society and human rights organizations still makes it possible to prosecute criminals. In 2003 (20 years after the collapse of the dictatorship), after the abolition of immunities, a new wave of trials began. By 2010, more than 800 defendants had appeared in court, and about 200 had been convicted. Within the framework of these processes, not only the military, but also civilian accomplices to crimes, including clergy, judges, and former ministers, are prosecuted. In parallel, thousands of applications for compensation have been filed under programs adopted in the early 1990s. Although these programs were criticized as a way to «buy off» crimes, they helped establish the idea of state responsibility and became a significant practice of restorative justice.

In a new round of transitional justice processes in Argentina, special attention is paid not only to women, but also to children and young people. Recognizing them as separate categories of victims and active participants in restorative processes is of key importance for overcoming the gap of intergenerational cycles of violence and impunity.

The consequences of conflicts and repressions are particularly hard on young people. Attacks on schools, forced recruitment, sexualized violence, forced displacement, deprivation of medical care: these and other violations deeply traumatize victims and limit their future. To fully understand the scale and consequences of violations, it is necessary to hear their voices and consider their right to express an opinion on matters affecting their lives, in accordance with age, as enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The Polish «Solidarity» movement represents a valuable model of non-violent resistance and institutional learning, creating parallel social structures. Workers, engineers, teachers, clergy, and students built practices of self-government and collective responsibility, formally achieving trade union rights, and actually working out ways of autonomous management.

Russian society must soberly assess its strength and work in several directions at once. It is necessary to think through scenarios for the future, calculating that a window of opportunity will open at some point, and to produce structural changes right now, which may require, as in other societies, the work of generations. In each of the scenarios, it is advisable to preserve existing practices: the work of «Memorial,» the educational practices that the School of Civic Education has been conducting for more than 34 years, new joint initiatives of the civil and anti-war communities, including bright examples of the FAS, LGBTQ+ solidarity, and emerging decolonial initiatives, which show the society’s ability to resist and form a demand for new cultural and political norms.

The publication was originally prepared in Russian for the media project «Strana i Mir — Sakharov Review»