The defeats of authoritarian leaders in elections in Hungary, Serbia and the United States have shown that democratic backsliding is not inevitable, but they have not answered the question of what comes next. Can civil society not only win, but also hold on to what it has won? Do international institutions, from the UN to the OSCE, still have real leverage in a world where the rule of the strong increasingly prevails over the strength of the rule of law, and where security is built out of walls and weapons? And how can European democracies defend themselves against disinformation without becoming a mirror image of those who spread it? Political scientists, diplomats, journalists and human rights defenders debated these questions at the School’s forum «In Search of Lost Universalism» in Berlin.

«We have not lost the idea of universalism… but we have lost our sense of direction»

The values that underpin international law have not gone anywhere; it has simply become harder to see which way to go, believes Walter Kaufmann, Head of the East and Southeast Europe Division at the Heinrich Böll Foundation. «I think we have not lost the idea of universalism nor all of its principles, but we have lost our sense of direction,» he said in his welcome remarks. Perhaps, in his view, this is less about finding something lost and more about «continuing to build, reaffirm and renew something that we have never fully achieved.»

Kaufmann noted that 76 percent of the world’s population now live under regimes «that value the rule of the strong far more than the strength of the rule of law.» He suggested that these regimes are so successful partly because «we have never given our alternative — that means security for all, grounded in a universal system of values and rights — enough real power and/or credibility.» Speaking «from a Western and German perspective,» he gave examples of this «credibility gap.» The West, he said, «engaged too little and too late with voices from the global south,» treated certain autocrats «as guarantors of stability or at least as the lesser evil,» and repeatedly put economic interests ahead of principles: «Have we really learned the lessons of Nord Stream 2???»

According to Kaufmann, the work of the School of Civic Education «is more relevant than ever» and «can give us hope»: «I think it helps us to discuss about politics, business, the media, and civil society, how they can work together to connect the need for security with the vision of just community for all.»

Michael Sohlman, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the School of Civic Education, remarked that relations between Europe and the United States today resemble a divorce that has not yet been finalized. The changes now under way in the world are, in his words, «tectonic»: the great powers are «no longer so great,» China is advancing «at an ever slower pace,» India is rising, and hope comes from middle powers such as Canada that are trying to resist the destruction of international rules. On security, Europe still depends heavily on the United States, and although it is customary to put on a brave face, «everyone understands that these guarantees are very, very uncertain.»

It is often said that Russia’s war against Ukraine has become a turning point for the world, but according to Inna Berezkina, Head of Programmes at the School of Civic Education, that moment came earlier. «One of those was 12 years ago with the annexation of Crimea when this war started,» she said. Before Crimea there were Georgia and the Chechen wars, and after them came «the impunity that followed all those crimes. This is what brought us to this very day.» Is there room for words when people are dying every day? In her view there is, «if words are preceded by action and lead to action.» Berezkina sees the missing element of the world’s architecture in an active civil society, «not as experts, not just as activists, but people who would be at the decision-making table at the end.»

«In 2026 there was a taking back of inevitable authoritarianism»

Civil society can defeat authoritarianism, but it cannot and should not itself become the government, argues historian and writer Diana Pinto. She went through several recent scenarios in which authoritarian leaders were defeated. In Hungary, Orbán was brought down by Péter Magyar, a man from his own camp. He was not «the ideal candidate of the dissidents, the social democrats, the intellectuals,» but he turned out to be «a kind of strange creature that gave this kind of ability for… civil society to come out again.» In Serbia, street activists and academics came to power, and this is «a most fragile moment»: «the very essence of civil society is to have plurality of voices, of positions, of identities, and even programs that are not meant to come together.» In the United States, voters in the midterm elections voted for decency, tired of «this kind of crazy hatred in power in the White House.»

«We don’t really know whether one of these turning points remains really significant in the very long run, but all I can say is that there was an element of universalism» in these elections, says Diana Pinto. What matters is to recognize that «in 2026 there was a taking back of inevitable authoritarianism.»

Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann said that the more she studies autocracies, the more she is amazed «not at the resilience of autocracies, but rather at the existence of democracies.» «I think we do not value enough the miracle of electoral rotation,» she said, meaning that people in power voluntarily and without violence step down as a result of a procedure carried out by their fellow citizens. According to Schulmann, «it has been rather an impression until recently that in stable systems voters turnout tends to be low.» She compared the high turnout in the recent elections in the United States, Hungary and Serbia to body temperature: if it is too high, «it may be a sign of some internal inflammation process,» but a fever can also help to «expel a virus.» She finds the Serbian experience particularly interesting, since the Hungarian autocracy «has been constrained rather severely by European norms,» whereas «resemblances between Russia and Serbia are self-evident.» In Serbia, the regime was changed not by a new leader or an opposition party but by a grassroots movement whose assemblies resemble «the original idea of Soviet[s] as it was invented in the beginning of the last century.»

Comparing two opposition tactics, the Iranian boycott of elections and Russian participation, Schulmann admitted that «my sympathies are on the side of participation,» although «neither so far has [effected] regime change.» «Political participation is meaningful to people, to citizens who still believe in the meaningfulness of the electoral institutions. If subversion of institutions have gone far enough to make such belief impossible, we cannot wonder at people […] refusing to do what they have been forced to do, that is to participate in the meaningless elections,» she says.

«We talk about security more, much more than peace»

Journalist Mikhail Fishman believes that Putin «could have achieved less, if the West would have stayed united.» But what do the West, international institutions and civil society amount to today?

We talk too much about security and too little about peace, says conflict resolution expert Natalia Mirimanova. The problem, in her view, is that «we see security as the end, as the destination rather than a step towards peace»: «And so we build walls, we accumulate weapons and we seal borders and we call it stability.» The very word «peace» is problematic today: «it’s equated with surrender.» International institutions are largely blocked: the UN by the veto, the OSCE by consensus (for two years the organization had no budget, partly because Russia objected to wording about its aggression against Ukraine). And money for peacebuilding is shrinking: «It’s out of fashion.»

Still, Mirimanova urged not to write off this architecture. What matters is that «they still talk.» As an example, she cited a language policy dialogue in the Moldovan parliament that she launched as an adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities after six months of shuttle diplomacy: «I couldn’t have done it in my private capacity.» She admits that «this might sound small, but this is how it works.» «So, I would say it’s better to have it than not to have it,» she concluded.

When the US, Russia and Europe are all in decline, the key question is «who managed to decline best?», believes Stefan Meister, Head of the Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the DGAP. He sees hope in the way societies punish corrupt regimes — in Hungary, Serbia and the United States — and called for a closer look at these success stories, as well as at the example of Ukraine. For now, in his words, «Russia with its level of adaptability, I would say it’s successful in short term,» while «Europe might be in longer term able to adapt to new realities, but it really needs to reinvent itself.» «If you outsource your security for a long time, if you still think you have a comfort zone without doing anything for your own defense, on one point you learn your lessons,» Meister said. But both Russia and Europe will depend on US and Chinese technology and will not shape the technological competition of the next decade: «The longer Russia is isolated from US and European technology, the more it will be dependent on China.»

The war in Sudan has been going on for almost four years, but «the world has chosen to be silent about it,» said Hager Eissa, a human rights defender from Sudan and member of the Leadership Council of the World Liberty Congress. In her view, international institutions have failed this country too: the International Criminal Court never held former dictator Bashir to account, and when Sudan was finally discussed at an international session, it was not civil society that was invited but representatives of the Rapid Support Forces, whose leader Hemedti, she said, is the one «committing all the human rights violations.» «There is no difference between the rebels or even the army in the country,» Eissa says. She assigns a major role in this war to Russia, although other countries, including the UAE, also supply weapons. When help does not come, civil society holds together: people organize communities and cook together for those who have had to leave their homes.

«We must have an ethical codex. We cannot mirror»

In the past the problem was that there was too little information, but «now we have a totally different problem that there’s too much of the information and there’s a lot of white noise,» says Vytis Jurkonis, Director for Europe and Eurasia Programs at Freedom House. In a world full of GPS tools, «we are lacking the [coordinates] more and more,» and students do not read books and rely on social media. That is why, he said, initiatives like the School of Civic Education exist, «which is a very important and necessary thing.» He sees the key in education and media literacy rather than only in debunking fakes. After the annexation of Crimea, many countries launched projects to counter disinformation, but in his view the share devoted to media literacy «should have been much bigger.» The ordinary citizen watching TV, Jurkonis says, «is actually raising a question: can we trust anyone?» In his words, «the disinformation thing is basically this fear,» which attacks our confidence and our will to act, and «we are all agents of that change.»

The most dangerous consequence of propaganda, according to Friederike Behr, Advocacy Coordinator at the Civil Society Forum, is not that people choose lies over truth, but that they stop trusting journalists, scientists and the government altogether. She recalled how residents of the parts of Ukraine occupied after 2014 repeated stories from Russia’s Channel One rather than what they had seen themselves: «they trusted the state propaganda more than their own eyes.» She sees the same distrust in Germany. The previous government of Olaf Scholz, the so-called «traffic light» coalition of Social Democrats, Free Democrats and Greens, delivered on many of its promises, but attitudes towards it were shaped by the AfD’s negative propaganda.

Sabine Fischer, Senior Fellow at the Research Group on Eastern Europe and Eurasia at SWP, said that «Russia is pursuing a kind of policy of regime change towards European democracies.» Moscow relies on anti-system actors: the far right and, interestingly, the far left, ultra-conservative NGOs and foundations. They are united by shared narratives: for example, the Kremlin claims that «so-called cosmopolitan Western elites oppress not only the world, of course, but also the majorities… within their own societies.» The Kremlin’s goals, in her words, are to undermine European support for Ukraine, destabilize European democracies and discredit democracy as such. Putin says so openly: «We know that we have many friends in European democracies.»

To counter this, Fischer said, education and training are important, but «at this stage we also need a lot more robust responses» — for example, stricter enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act, which obliges social media platforms to tackle disinformation. But robustness has its limits: «I think democracies start to undermine themselves if and when they start to implement measures [equal to the] information warfare and hybrid warfare that we experience coming from actors like Russia. So I think this is where we should, you know, stop.» It is also important, she stressed, that «our response to hybrid warfare really needs to distinguish between the Russian regime and the Russian democratic [emigration]… who are actually our partners in fighting exactly this threat.»

Russia’s cognitive war «is really massive,» and Europe risks losing it, warned diplomat Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Citing data from the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency (established in 2022), he said that more than 50 state-affiliated entities, including commercial companies, are engaged in information warfare in Russia, with a budget estimated at € 1.3−1.7 billion. «So this is so much more than we are spending in Europe on our responses.» Europe, he believes, is too cautious: «we are very reactive, if not to say passive.» But in countering Russian propaganda, «here we come immediately into these moral dilemmas,» the expert notes: «How far can we go? How far should we go? […] We must have an ethical codex. We cannot mirror. We cannot have a troll factory like that. But we could weaponize truth, you know, about corruption, about the cost of war and so on in a much wider sense.»